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Who Regulates the Disposal of Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Under the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Act? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The present existence of immense quantities of low-level nuclear 
waste,1 a federal law providing for state or regional control of such 
waste disposal,2 and a number of state disposal laws challenged on a 
variety of constitutional grounds3 underscore what currently may be 
the most serious problem in nuclear waste disposal: who is to regulate 
the disposal of low-level nuclear wastes. This problem's origin may be 
traced to crucial omissions in the Atomic Energy Act of 19464 and its 
1954 amendments (AEA)5 that concern radioactive waste disposal.6 
Although the AEA states that nuclear materials and facilities are af-
fected with the public interest and should be regulated to provide for 
the public health and safety,7 the statute fails to prescribe specific 
guidelines for any nuclear waste disposal. Indeed, more than thirty 
years after passage of the AEA, the Senate Committee on Energy and 
1 Low-level waste includes industrial sludges, resins, liquids, contaminated protective cloth-
ing, tools and instruments from nuclear power plants, factories, hospitals, and universities. 42 
U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982). 
2 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-(d) (1982)). 
3 California denies certification of new reactors until the federal government finds and ap-
proves a demonstrated technology or means of high-level nuclear waste disposal (Warren-Al-
quist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 
2500-2598 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981)); Illinois prohibits transportation into or storage within 
Illinois of spent fuel rods used in any power generating facility located outside the state (Spent 
Fuel Act, I I I . REV. STAT. ch. 111.5 para. 230.21-42 (Supp. 1981)); Montana prohibits the dispo-
sal of radioactive material in Montana no matter where generated (MONT. CODE ANN., § 75-3-
103(1) (1981)); New Hampshire prohibits the storage or disposal of radioactive waste within 
New Hampshire or its coastal jurisdiction (Act of June 23, 1979, ch. 350, 1979 N.H. LAWS 400); 
Washington sought to prohibit transportation into and storage within Washington of non-medi-
cal radioactive waste generated outside of Washington (1981 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. Chapter 1, §§ 
3, 4 (West)). 
4 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2284 (1982)). 
8 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011-2284 (1982)). 
8 Radioactive wastes include low-level waste (see supra note 1) and high level wastes, i.e., 
those generated in the reprocessing of nuclear fuel and others so classified by the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 10101(12) (1982); 10 C.F.R. § 61.2 (1984). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d). 
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Natural Resources reported that "during this time the establishment 
by the Federal Government of a definitive policy for the long-term 
storage or disposal of these wastes has not been granted high priority. 
Meanwhile the quantities of civilian nuclear wastes have continued to 
grow."8 
The Senate committee also reported that there were seventy pri-
vate nuclear power plants in 1980 with an additional ninety sched-
uled to begin production by 1990.9 At the same time, there were only 
three operating low-level nuclear waste disposal sites in the country, 
located at: Richland, Washington; Beatty, Nevada; and Barnwell, 
South Carolina.10 Fearing that these sites would become the country's 
permanent repositories, the governors of these states implored Con-
gress for relief. Congress finally addressed the problem by passing the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA).11 
The LLRWPA grants states some control over radioactive waste 
disposal, an area from which they were previously excluded by the 
doctrine of federal preemption.12 States may form regional compacts, 
under transfer agreements with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC),13 that take over the siting and construction of waste disposal 
facilities within the compact region. The LLRWPA's authorization of 
regional compacts introduces a third layer of authority14 into what 
was at first a relatively clear issue of federal preemption versus the 
states' traditional rights. 
Almost simultaneously with Congress' passage of the LLRWPA, 
many states began passing their own laws regulating the disposal and 
transportation of wastes within their borders.15 Some state laws even 
prohibit further construction of nuclear power plants.16 Predictably, 
the nuclear industry has fought these laws in the courts.17 
8 S. REP. NO. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
6933, 6934. 
» Id. 
10 See Dineen, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy, ENVIRONMENT, Dec. 1985, at 35. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d). 
12 Id. 
18 The government's regulatory arm under the Acts of 1946 and 1954 was the Atomic Energy 
Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2031. The Atomic Energy Commission was replaced by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in 1974. See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 
Stat. 1233 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5849 (1982)). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 188-192. 
18 See supra note 3. 
19 See, e.g., California Nuclear Moratorium Law, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & 
Supp. 1981). 
17 See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. 
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that California's 
law denying certification to new reactors was preempted by federal nuclear energy development 
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This Comment will discuss the question of who regulates low-level 
radioactive waste disposal facilities by examining the following: the 
constitutional doctrines safeguarding federal government authority; 
areas of state authority; grants of specific authority delegations under 
the AEA and subsequent acts dealing with nuclear energy, especially 
the LLRWPA and its amendment; and finally, potential problems 
that may arise depending on whether ultimate regulatory authority is 
deemed to rest with single states, regional compacts, or the federal 
government. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY 
A. Supremacy Clause 
The supremacy clause of the Constitution establishes federal law 
as the supreme law of the land.18 The clause has been interpreted to 
mean that to the extent that state laws conflict with federal laws, 
they are preempted.19 State laws can be expressly preempted by acts 
of Congress or impliedly preempted by federal statutory schemes 
that demonstrate Congress' intent to occupy a particular field.20 
Express preemption is the most direct form of preemption and it 
generates little debate: enforcement of inconsistent state laws is pro-
hibited in an area that Congress has chosen to regulate.21 In the ab-
sence of express preemption, courts must determine whether Con-
gress has impliedly preempted regulation of a field.22 To do so, they 
generally look for one of two sets of circumstances. One set of cir-
regulation); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1976); Illinois v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (General Electric Co. and Southern Calif. Edison 
sought a declaratory judgment that Illinois' law prohibiting transportation into or disposal 
within Illinois of spent nuclear fuel rods was unconstitutional); Washington State Bldg. & 
Const. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627 
(9th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 
Washington's statute banning transportation and storage within the state of radioactive waste 
produced outside Washington. The court of appeals held the statute violated the supremacy 
and commerce clauses). 
18 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ." U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2. 
19 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819). 
20 Congressional regulatory purpose may be evidenced by an act that touches "a field in 
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947). 
21 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977) (Federal Meat Inspection 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1982) requires state laws to comply with federal meat labelling 
requirements). 
" Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
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cumstances occurs when the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive 
that it appears that Congress did not intend for states to regulate in 
this area.23 This is the occupation of the field principle. When a court 
determines that Congress has occupied the field, there is no room for 
state regulation.24 In making this determination, courts look only at 
the congressional act itself.25 The other set of circumstances leads to 
the conflict principle: a state law must fall if it produces a result in-
consistent with a federal law26 or "stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress."27 In determining that a state law must give way under the 
conflict principle, courts look at the effect of the particular state law 
on the federal regulatory scheme. 
B. Commerce Clause 
Congress has ultimate authority to regulate interstate commerce,28 
which has been traditionally defined as anything that is in the flow of 
traffic between or among states.29 State laws regulating the flow of 
interstate commerce have been upheld if they serve a legitimate state 
interest and are applied even-handedly.30 However, whenever a state 
law obstructing the flow of interstate commerce is challenged, the 
court will balance the state's putative need to regulate against the 




26 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("fed-
eral exclusion of state law is inescapable . . . where compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility."). 
27 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
28 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (see supra note 18 for text of clause). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
28 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 76. 
38 Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978) ("it never has been 
doubted that much state legislation, designed to serve legitimate state interests and applied 
without discrimination against interstate commerce, does not violate the commerce clause even 
though it affects commerce"). 
31 The balancing standard usually used is the three-prong test of Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. 
397 U.S. 137 (1970) (evenhanded regulation, fulfillment of a legitimate local public purpose, 
incidental effect on interstate commerce) or the two-tiered test of City of Phila. v. New Jersey 
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (whether the state action is a protectionist measure discriminating against 
out-of-state commerce and whether the state's reason for such treatment of foreign commerce 
is justified). 
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III. STATE AUTHORITY 
A. Traditional Police Power Areas of State Regulation 
Pursuant to their so-called police powers,32 the states have tradi-
tionally enacted legislation to protect the health, safety, and welfare 
of their citizens.33 For example, states have generally been allowed to 
regulate railroads and highways within the state,34 and public utility 
franchises " 'may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the 
State.' "3B The Supreme Court has recently designated environmental 
protection as a legitimate local purpose "similar to the States' inter-
ests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens."36 
B. New Areas of State Regulation Stemming 
From States' Police Powers 
State regulation of nuclear power plants was recently upheld in Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Development Commission37 as a valid extension of a state's 
power to regulate other utilities, even though earlier case law stated 
the opposite view. For example, in the 1971 case of Northern States 
Power Company v. Minnesota,38 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit decided that while the AEA "does not use the 
terms 'exclusive' or 'sole' in describing existing regulatory responsi-
bilities of the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission," the tone of the 
statute and its legislative history evidenced Congress' implied pre-
emption of state regulation of nuclear plants.39 
In Northern States, Northern States Power Company (Northern), 
a Minnesota corporation, applied to the Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency for a waste disposal permit for a plant being built under 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) guidelines. Northern received its 
82 See, generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6, at 401-545 (1988). 
33 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (the police power sup-
ports ordinances unless they can be declared "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and without 
substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."). 
84 See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), 
allowing states to regulate the weight and width of vehicles using their roads and railways. The 
regulations must accomplish public safety objectives and not be intended to benefit local eco-
nomic interests. This test asks the first two questions of Pike and both questions of City of 
Phila., as explained supra in note 31. 
38 Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190, 205 (1983) (quoting Frost v. Corp. Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1929) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
38 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). 
37 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 223. 
38 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
89 447 F.2d at 1149. 
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permit in May 1969, but found that the permit required the company 
to meet substantially more stringent conditions regulating the level 
of radioactive discharges than those imposed by the AEC. Northern 
filed suit in August 1969, arguing that the AEC's authority pre-
empted Minnesota's authority to regulate radioactive discharges from 
nuclear power plants. In agreeing with Northern, the court noted that 
the objectives of Congress "encourage the development, use and con-
trol of atomic energy so as to make the maximum contribution to the 
general welfare and to increase the standard of living."40 The court 
concluded that any state regulation of nuclear power would create an 
obstacle to achieving these congressional objectives.41 
In light of the Northern States holding, some states' subsequent 
attempts to regulate nuclear power plants were deemed an intrusion 
into the federal sphere.42 However, the states did not give up. In 1976 
the California legislature tried a new approach, passing the California 
Nuclear Laws.43 Although the federal government is responsible for 
ensuring the safety of nuclear power, the states historically exercise 
authority over generating and selling electricity.44 The California laws 
avoid intruding into the federal sphere because they respond to eco-
nomic concerns such as "the risk that the insufficiency of interim 
storage space for spent fuel will lead to reactor shutdowns, rendering 
nuclear energy an unpredictable and uneconomical adventure."45 Cal-
ifornia's nuclear laws deny certification of new reactors in California 
until the federal government, pursuant to its authority to resolve the 
nuclear waste problem, finds that there exists and approves "a 
demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nu-
clear waste."46 
In separate cases filed in different districts, the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation47 and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)48 challenged 
40 Id. at 1153 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-12 (1982)). 
41 Id. at 1154 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
42 See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 215 (7th Cir. 1982) (the NRC has 
exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards); Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wash. 1981) ("Congress intended that the 
transportation and storage of all materials which pose radiation hazards would be regulated by 
the federal government except where jurisdiction was expressly ceded to the states."). 
48 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25001 (West 1977). California's nuclear laws are part of the Warren-
Alquist Energy Act, supra note 3. 
44 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n 461 
U.S. 190, 194 (1983). 
48 Id. at 196-97. 
49 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981). 
47 Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n 472 F 
Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979). 
48 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F. 
Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980). 
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California's nuclear laws. PG&E sought a declaratory judgment that 
the laws were preempted by federal regulation of nuclear energy de-
velopment. Pacific Legal Foundation filed a similar challenge. In both 
cases, the district courts held that those aspects of the California 
laws that attempted to regulate nuclear power plants were 
preempted.49 
In a consolidated appeal,50 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded Pacific Legal Foundation 
on grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing.51 The plaintiff utility 
company in the Pacific Gas and Electric part of the case claimed 
that Northern States was controlling,52 but the Ninth Circuit re-
jected this contention, finding that California's laws were based on 
economic factors, a traditional area of state police powers.63 The 
court held that California's laws did not obstruct the congressional 
purpose of promoting atomic energy use since the AEA did not es-
pouse development of atomic energy "at all costs."54 The court up-
held California's reading of the AEA, one that allows a state to exer-
cise its "inherent" regulatory authority to consider its own economic 
and environmental objectives in deciding to accept or reject nuclear 
power at all.55 
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that 
California's laws were based on economic rather than safety motives 
and therefore within the state's sphere of authority.56 The Court held 
that there was no direct conflict between federal and state law and 
that California's laws did not frustrate congressional goals.57 The 
message of Pacific Gas and Electric is that states may regulate cer-
tain aspects of nuclear power so long as the regulations address tradi-
tional state police powers and not the statutorily preempted area of 
nuclear safety. 
49 Pacific Legal Found., 472 F. Supp. at 197, 200-01; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 489 F. Supp. at 
703-04. 
80 Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., 659 F.2d 
903 (9th Cir. 1981). 
81 Id. at 913-14. 
82 Id. at 923. 
83 Id. at 923-25. 
64 Id. at 926. 
88 Id. 
56 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 
190, 212 (1983). 
57 Id. at 216, 219. 
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C. Congressional Grants of State Authority 
In addition to exercising their inherent police powers, states may 
regulate areas specifically addressed in congressional grants of au-
thority. The following such grants indicate that Congress intends 
states to have some regulatory power over nuclear and radioactive 
materials. 
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1977. The FWPCA58 
enables state governments, under Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) guidelines, to regulate the discharge of water pollutants, in-
cluding some radioactive pollutants.59 Under the FWPCA it is unlaw-
ful to discharge pollutants into the nation's navigable waters without 
a permit showing that the pollutants do not exceed certain effluent 
limitations.60 The permits are issued by the Administrator of the 
EPA or by a state if the state has developed a program in compliance 
with the FWPCA.61 The statute also allows states to promulgate 
guidelines even stricter than those of the EPA.62 However, the 
FWPCA leaves intact the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 
authority over the discharge of source, by-product, and special nu-
clear materials.63 
If source, by-product, and special nuclear materials can be consid-
ered "pollutants" under the FWPCA's definition,64 they come under 
58 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)), amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 
91 Stat. 1567, 1575 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). 
88 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982). 
80 Id. § 1311(b). 
81 Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342. 
82 Id. §§ 1251(b), 1370. 
83 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 defines source material as: "(1) uranium, thorium, or any 
other material which is determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of section 
2091 of this title to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing 
materials, in such concentrations as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to 
time." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(2) (1982). 
By-product material is defined as: "(1) any radioactive material (except special nuclear mate-
rial) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of 
producing or utilizing special nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the 
extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its 
source material." Id. § 2014(e) (1982). 
Special nuclear material is defined as: "(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 
in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of 
section 2071 of this title, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source 
material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include 
source material." Id. § 2014(aa). 
64 "The term 'pollutant' is defined by the FWPCA to include, inter alia, 'radioactive materi-
als.' But when the Administrator of the EPA adopted regulations governing the permit pro-
gram, . . . he specifically excluded source, by-product, and special nuclear materials—those 
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EPA, and, therefore, state control. Whether this is the case was the 
issue in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group.96 In 
Train, Colorado organizations and residents (the respondents) 
claimed potential harm from radioactive effluents discharged from 
two Colorado-based nuclear power plants.66 Although the power 
plants met AEC effluent standards,67 the respondents wanted the 
plants to be held to the higher EPA or state standards. Therefore, 
the respondents brought suit against the EPA seeking: (1) a declara-
tion that "pollutants" under the FWPCA included even those radio-
active materials regulated under the AEA,68 and (2) an injunction re-
quiring the EPA to regulate the discharge of all radioactive 
materials.89 The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend 
the FWPCA to affect the regulatory authority of the NRC as estab-
lished under the AEA.70 As a result, source, by-product, and special 
nuclear materials continue to be regulated by the NRC. The Court 
also held, however, that the FWPCA authorizes the states to regulate 
radium and accelerator-produced isotopes.71 Therefore, although the 
respondents failed in their attempt to have all radioactive discharges 
brought under EPA control, the Train decision underscores that the 
FWPCA authorizes states to set standards for certain radioactive 
wastes. 
2. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974. The Safe Drinking Water 
Act72 establishes a joint EPA-state program of regulating contami-
nants, including radiological substances,73 in public water systems. 
The statute was passed to control contaminant levels in tap water 
and protect underground drinking water sources from contamination 
resulting from improper underground injection.74 Therefore, tap 
water from public water systems must meet national regulations lim-
covered by the AEA." Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 7-8 (1976). 
85 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 




70 Id. at 23-25. 
71 Id. at 11-12. 
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1982). 
73 Id. § 300f(6). See also H.R REP. No. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6454, 6469. 
74 Underground injection is the injection of wastes into wells specially dug for that purpose. 
When the SDWA of 1974 was passed, underground injectors included municipalities (disposing 
of sewage, sludge, and other wastes), industries (injecting chemicals, by-products and wastes), 
and energy production companies (disposing of brines). H.R. REP. NO. 1185, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 16, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6454, 6481. 
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iting contaminant levels and prescribing treatment techniques.75 Pri-
vate, state, and federal underground injectors must obtain permits 
imposing conditions that safeguard underground drinking water 
sources.76 Under the 1974 Act, states had primary enforcement re-
sponsibility for public water systems if the states' drinking water reg-
ulations were no less stringent than national regulations77 and if the 
states had adopted adequate enforcement, record-keeping, and ex-
emption procedures.78 
In 1986 Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-
ments (Amendments).79 The Amendments set more rigorous stan-
dards for compliance, enforcement, and groundwater protection. The 
states continue to have primary enforcement responsibility, but the 
Amendments strengthen the EPA's ability to take enforcement ac-
tion when states have failed to do so.80 Under both the Act and the 
Amendments, suspected violations are reported to the states, who in 
turn report them to the EPA. If the EPA "finds"81 a violation, it no-
tifies the state and the violator.82 Under the Act, if the state has not 
begun enforcement action within thirty days of notification, the Ad-
ministrator "may" commence such action.83 Under the Amendments, 
however, the Administrator "shall" commence an enforcement ac-
tion.84 This language indicates that Congress wants the EPA to be 
able to initiate more enforcement actions. One effect of the change 
could be that states, to preserve their enforcement autonomy, will 
more aggressively carry out their delegated enforcement duties. 
A new program established under the Amendments strengthens the 
states' regulatory role. The state Wellhead Protection Program au-
thorizes states to determine whether they need a wellhead protection 
program and which wellhead areas should be protected from contam-
ination.85 Significantly, federal agencies with jurisdiction over con-
taminant sources with potential to pollute a state's designated well-
head protection area are subject to the state's program 
78 42 U.S.C. § 300f(l). 
76 Id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 1185, supra note 74. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(l). 
78 Id. § 300g-2(a)(2), (3), (4). 
78 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-ll (West Supp. 1987). 
90 Id. §§ 300g-3(a). 
81 Id. §§ 300g-3(a), (g). 
82 Id. §§ 300g-3(a), 300h-2(a). 
83 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(a)(l)(A)-(B), 300h-2(a)(2) (1982). 
84 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(l)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1987). 
85 Id. § 300h-7(e). 
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requirements.86 
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The Northern States 
court asserted that Congress had impliedly preempted state regula-
tion of nuclear power plants.87 However, the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 
197088 provided that all federal facilities "shall comply with federal, 
state, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and abate-
ment of air pollution to the same extent any person is subject to such 
requirements."89 The CAA espoused the principle that "[e]ach State 
shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within 
the entire geographic area comprising such state."90 Kentucky inter-
preted this language to mean that it could require federal installa-
tions on state land to secure operating permits as required by its fed-
erally approved clean air implementation plan. In the ensuing case of 
Hancock v. Train,91 the Court rejected this view. It held that because 
the CAA did not, with "satisfactory clarity," evince intent to subject 
federal installations to state permit requirements, such an interpreta-
tion could not be mandated by the Court.92 
Congress overruled Northern States and answered the Hancock 
decision by passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.93 These 
amendments grant states, not the federal government, regulatory au-
thority over commercial nuclear facilities and materials. Once states' 
procedures are approved by the EPA, the states control the radioac-
tive air pollutants of commercial nuclear facilities.94 
In summary, the Safe Drinking Water Act95 establishes joint EPA-
state regulation, while the Federal Water Pollution Control Act96 and 
the Clean Air Act Amendments provide for state authority once the 
state scheme garners EPA approval.97 These acts show that Congress 
does not consider that only the federal government may regulate ra-
diation hazards. These grants of authority establish, therefore, that 
88 Id. § 300h-7(h). 
87 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1149 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See also text accompanying note 38. 
88 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676-1713 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1982)). 
88 Id. § 1857F. 
80 Id. § 1857c-2(a). 
91 426 U.S. 167 (1976). 
92 Id. at 198. The Court did not preclude the possibility, however, that federal installations 
could be subject to state permit requirements, stating "[s]hould this nevertheless be the desire 
of Congress, it need only amend the Act to make its intention manifest." Id. 
93 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982)). 
94 Id. § 7412(d)(1). 
88 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-ll (West Supp. 1987). 
86 See supra note 58. 
87 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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the states, subject to EPA guidelines, may regulate various radioac-
tive wastes and air pollutants. 
IV. REGIONAL COMPACTS 
The LLRWPA authorizes the states to form regional compacts to 
develop disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste.98 Because these 
regional compacts are interstate compacts, they are governed by the 
compact clause99 of the Constitution. "[Interstate agreements 
presenting even potential encroachments on federal supremacy"100 
are conditioned upon congressional approval under the compact 
clause. Individual states agree or contract101 to form compacts. Since 
it is a contract, a compact "may not be amended, modified, or other-
wise altered without the consent of all parties."102 A state may not 
pass legislation that alters either its responsibilities within the com-
pact or the compact's goals, nor may it withdraw unilaterally from a 
compact.103 Further, once a compact is approved by Congress, it be-
comes federal law. Various cases that construe compact law imply 
that once states enter into compacts, the states are subordinate to 
the compact.104 
It is unclear to what degree a compact can be modified after it is 
formed. If all signatories agree to the modification, it should be per-
missible.105 Individual states apparently must abide by the terms as 
initially set out if they cannot persuade all signatories to agree to the 
changes. Even Congress' ability to make modifications in a compact 
it has approved is unclear. In 1855 the Supreme Court held that Con-
gress' commerce clause power took precedence over its compact 
clause power, suggesting that Congress could exercise its authority to 
regulate commerce regardless of existing compacts.106 Over a century 
88 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-2021d (1982). 
89 "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Com-
pact with another State." U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 10, cl. 3. 
IOO "[T]he terms compact and contract are synonymous." Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 
1, 92 (1823). 
"" Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893). 
102 CT. Hellmuth & Assoc, v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D. 
Md. 1976). See also Kansas City Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1981) ("One 
party to an interstate compact may not enact legislation which would impose burdens upon the 
compact absent the concurrence of other signatories.") Id. at 174. 
,03 Green, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 92-93. 
104 See, e.g„ Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Rao v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 122 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 
1955); Intake Water v. Board of Natural Resource & Conservation, 197 Mont. 482, 645 P.2d 
383, 386 (1982). 
108 Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 640 F.2d at 174. 
108 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1855). 
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later, however, the Second Circuit refused to hold that Congress has 
"the implied constitutional power to alter, amend or repeal its con-
sent to an interstate compact."107 
V. REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER THE AEA AND SUBSEQUENT 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACTS 
A. Atomic Energy Act 
Congress passed the first Atomic Energy Act in 1946 (the 1946 
Act),108 "when atomic energy was popularly associated only with the 
atom bomb."109 The 1946 Act allowed private industry to conduct re-
search and build commercial reactors under license from the AEC,110 
the government's regulatory arm,111 but it made "the manufacture 
and use of atomic materials a Government monopoly."112 In 1954, 
when the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)113 replaced the 1946 Act, 
the civilian role was broadened: the statute encouraged "widespread 
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the com-
mon defense and security and with the health and safety of the pub-
lic."114 The AEA was amended again in 1959 to establish a regulatory 
role for the states:115 they may agree to be responsible for the dispo-
sal of nuclear waste.116 The balance between federal and state power 
in this area, however, is anything but clear. Since the AEA merely 
states purposes and does not codify the regulatory roles of states or 
of the federal government,117 it would appear that Congress intended 
the courts to determine the scope of federal preemption. 
The federal government, through the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
107 Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962) 
(Congress' express reservation of rights to alter, amend, or repeal its consent to a compact is 
predicated on whether Congress has such power under the Constitution. Since this power is not 
expressly given to Congress by the Constitution, if it exists at all, it must exist as an implied 
power). 
108 Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2022-2284 (1982)). 
108 S. R. REP. NO. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 3456, 3457. 
118 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(f), (p), 2131-34 (1982). 
m See id. § 2251 (1982). 
112 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3456, 3458. 
113 42 §§ 2011-2281 (1982). 
114 Id. § 2013(d). 
118 Id. § 2021. 
1,8 Id. § 2021(a)(4). 
117 Id. § 2021. See also Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1156 (8th 
Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). ("Congress knew how to establish federal preemp-
tion by expressly providing therefor in clear language. No such language was incorporated into 
the Act"). 
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sion (NRC),118 licenses nuclear power plants and nuclear waste stor-
age and disposal facilities119 and regulates potential radiation 
hazards.120 Generally, states may regulate nuclear activities of AEA 
licensed facilities within their borders in the areas of "health, safety, 
and economic purposes other than radiation protection."121 Radiolog-
ical safety, though, remains the federal government's province 
through regulation of "the construction and operation of any produc-
tion or utilization facility."122 However, the states may sometimes 
regulate radiation protection by entering into agreements with the 
NRC that provide for state regulation of by-product materials, source 
materials, and, in certain circumstances, special nuclear materials, 
i.e., low-level nuclear wastes.123 In short, Congress regulates the 
safety hazards of high level nuclear energy, and the states, subject to 
NRC approval and regulation, may agree to be responsible for other 
aspects of nuclear power, including radiological safety hazards. Thus, 
a potential exists for dual regulation in the safety area, with resulting 
federal-state conflicts. Because of this, the courts will probably 
strictly review state legislation that concerns radiological safety. In-
terestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Gas and Electric considered 
California's nuclear laws to be constitutional not because they were 
passed under a valid grant of authority from the federal govern-
ment,124 but because the court found an economic purpose for the 
legislation along with the safety purpose.125 
B. Radioactive Waste Policy Acts 
1. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA). 
The LLRWPA expresses two Congressional policies: (1) states are re-
sponsible for disposing of low-level radioactive waste generated 
within their borders,126 and (2) states can most effectively and safely 
dispose of low-level nuclear waste on a regional basis.127 
In stating that "[e]ach State shall be responsible for providing, ei-
118 See supra note 13. 
119 42 U.S.C. § 2241. 
120 Id. § 2021(c). 
121 Id. § 2021(b) allows the states to regulate special nuclear materials if they are in quanti-
ties not sufficient to form a critical mass, i.e., to create a nuclear fission chain reaction. Other-
wise, § 2021(c) establishes the NRC as the body with authority to license disposal activities. 
122 Id. § 2021(c). 
123 Id. § 2021(k). 
124 Id. § 2021(d). 
128 Pacific Legal Found, v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 
903, 923-25 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
128 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(l)(A) (1982). 
127 Id. § 2021d(a)(l). 
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ther by itself or in cooperation with other States, for the disposal"128 
of low-level wastes, Congress has expressly granted states authority 
to regulate low-level nuclear waste disposal. Unlike the situation 
where the AEA, through the NRC, delegated to states the authority 
to regulate some radiological safety hazards, or the situation in Pa-
cific Gas and Electric where the Court found a permissible economic 
motive for state regulation, the LLRWPA requires each state to dis-
pose of its nuclear waste. Congress has given up its right to be the 
exclusive regulator in this area. 
The statute emphasizes the state as a distinct entity—"each State" 
is responsible "either by itself or in cooperation" with other states.129 
However, the second policy of the LLRWPA is that the states should 
work together in nuclear waste disposal. These responsibilities belong 
to the states and may be best met by the states working together in 
regional compacts. 
To encourage states to form regional compacts as quickly as possi-
ble, Congress established July 1, 1986, as the deadline by which a 
state either had to have joined a compact or passed legislation to deal 
with its own wastes.130 After Congress approved a compact, the re-
gional disposal site would be allowed, beginning January 1, 1986, to 
refuse to accept waste produced outside the region.131 
2. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendment of 
1985.132 Various problems and delays in implementing the LLRWPA 
led to compromise legislation aimed at keeping the existing low-level 
sites open while other regional facilities could be developed.133 Under 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendment of 1985, 
compacts must submit plans for disposal facilities by January 1, 
1988, and must submit license applications to the NRC by January 1, 
1993.134 During this process, states that do not belong to compacts 
must limit the amounts of radioactive material they send to the ex-
isting sites.135 The out-of-region surcharge they must pay will double 
within the first six months of the 1988 deadline's one year grace pe-
128 Id. § 2021c(a)(l) (Supp. Ill 1985). 
129 Id. 
138 Id. § 2021d(c). 
131 Id. 
132 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2021b-2021j (West Supp. 1987). 
133 Many states were reluctant to join in compacts, states claimed disposal facilities couldn't 
be ready before the 1990s. See Dineen, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy, ENVIRONMENT, 
Dec. 1985, at 35. 
134 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1987). 
138 Id. § 2021e. 
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riod and will quadruple during the second six months.138 
VI. AUTHORITY UNDER THE LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY 
ACT AND ITS AMENDMENT 
A. Federal or State Authority? 
The LLRWPA expressly delegates authority to states to site, build, 
and manage low-level nuclear waste repositories. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, interpreted the 1980 
Act very narrowly in Washington State Building and Construction 
Trade Council v. Spellman.137 
In November 1980, Washington State voters enacted Initiative 383, 
which prohibited the "transportation and storage within Washington 
of radioactive waste produced outside the state"138 and provided for 
the formation of regional waste disposal compacts. Since 1964 the 
State of Washington has leased a 1,000 acre area of the Hanford Res-
ervation in Washington from the federal government, subleasing a 
part of that land as a commercial low-level radioactive waste 
dump.139 This is the Richland site, one of only three operating radio-
active waste repositories in the country.140 The site receives approxi-
mately forty percent of the nation's low-level nuclear waste, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of which originates outside of 
Washington.141 Washington monitors both the site and the shipments 
of waste sent to it.142 
Initiative 383 was attacked by the Richland site's operator and 
seven other plaintiffs, who sought a declaration that it was unconsti-
tutional. The United States filed a separate similar action. Both the 
site users and the government claimed that the initiative violated the 
commerce clause and that the AEA and the LLRWPA preempted 
state authority. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of 
Washington granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion,143 
striking down Initiative 383 as unconstitutional. The State of Wash-
ington appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.144 It found that Wash-
,38 Id. § 2021e(d)(l). 
137 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982). 





143 Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. 
Wash. 1981). 
144 Spellman, 684 F.2d at 632. 
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ington's purpose in passing the initiative was to exercise its police 
power to protect the health and safety of its citizens145 and concluded 
that this is an illegal purpose under the AEA, which reserves safety 
regulation of nuclear power to the federal government.146 
The court also examined the LLRWPA provision that permits 
states to form regional compacts. It agreed that "[b]ecause Congress 
specifically gives permission for regional disposal in this Act," states 
signatory to a compact could exclude waste from non-signatory states 
without violating the supremacy or commerce clauses.147 However, 
the court concluded that since at the time of the initiative Washing-
ton had not formed an interstate compact, it could not legally ex-
clude out-of-state wastes.148 The court apparently relied on the 
LLRWPA section dealing with regional compacts that states that re-
strictions on use of regional disposal sites by out-of-region producers 
shall not be effective until January 1, 1986, and until Congress has 
consented to the compact.149 
The Ninth Circuit also relied on a traditional commerce clause 
analysis to invalidate Washington's initiative. Citing the criteria of 
Pike v. Bruce Church,160 the court held that the initiative failed all 
three parts of the Pike test.151 The test considers that "[w]here the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public 
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."152 Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, the Washington initiative failed the first 
part of the Pike test, which requires that a state law regulate even-
handedly, because the initiative banned only out-of-state waste.153 
The initiative failed the second part of the test, that a state law ac-
complish a legitimate local public purpose, by failing to address "the 
manner in which local waste, (sic) transported and stored within 
Washington has superior safety and environmental virtues over waste 
produced elsewhere . . . ,"154 Finally, the Washington law failed the 
third part of the Pike test, that a state law should have only an inci-
148 Id. at 631. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 630. 
148 Id. 
148 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(c). 
180 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
181 Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631. 
182 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
183 Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631. 
184 Id. 
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dental effect on interstate commerce, because Washington receives 
forty percent of the country's low-level nuclear waste.156 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Spellman mirrors the rationale of 
Northern States.169 In both cases the court concluded that the AEA 
evidences Congress' implied preemption of state nuclear power regu-
lation. In Spellman the court found that Washington's exercise of its 
police power was an illegal purpose under the AEA. However, this is 
not a reason to invalidate the Washington initiative, since the AEA 
expresses federal preemption of high level waste regulation, not that 
involving low-level wastes. On the other hand, the LLRWPA dele-
gates full responsibility to states to control disposal of low-level nu-
clear wastes generated within their borders regardless of purposes. 
The Spellman court also found that Washington could not exclude 
out-of-state wastes because it had not yet joined a regional compact 
at the time the initiative was passed.157 However, contrary to the 
court's assumption, Washington was not acting in any compact ca-
pacity when it closed its borders to out-of-state wastes. It was acting 
to fulfill the other mandate of the statute, that states control disposal 
of low-level wastes generated within their borders. Although the com-
pact section is permissive ("States may enter into such compacts"),158 
the responsibility section is mandatory ("Each State shall be respon-
sible").159 The court could have interpreted Washington's closing of 
its dump to out-of-state wastes as a way of upholding the responsibil-
ity section. Pursuant to the LLRWPA's mandate, Washington pre-
served space in the dump for locally-produced wastes and en-
couraged, even forced, other states to accept responsibility for their 
own wastes. Instead, the court confused the statute's requirements in 
two respects. First, it insisted that Washington abide by the 1986 
deadline when that deadline is only relevant if a state decides to 
enter a compact. Second, it overlooked the fact that the statute re-
quires states immediately to assume responsibility for disposal of 
their low-level wastes. 
Finally, the court erred in using a commerce clause analysis to in-
validate the Washington initiative. Such a traditional analysis is un-
warranted where, as here, a federal statute mandates state activity. 
Although the court believed that the initiative failed the first part of 
188 Id. 
..6 4 4 7 F 2d 1143 (1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See text accompanying note 38. 
187 Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630. 
188 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). 
189 Id. § 2021c(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
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the Pike test,160 the LLRWPA requires that a state be responsible for 
disposing of its own wastes.161 Furthermore, the LLRWPA's legisla-
tive history reveals that the statute addresses an underlying problem 
of great magnitude. Senators Strom Thurmond and Ernest Hollings, 
who introduced the LLRWPA as a bill, explicitly stated Congress' 
mood and purpose in passing the legislation. Senator Thurmond 
declared: 
It is extremely unfair to allow three states to become the "dumping 
grounds" for waste which all 50 states generate. If other states are to 
share in the benefits of nuclear power production and nuclear 
medicine, they must begin to share in the responsibilities which in-
clude the unpleasant task of waste disposal.162 
Perhaps the most effective way to force other states to share in waste 
disposal responsibilities is to deny them access to existing facilities. 
Washington fulfilled the congressional mandate set forth in the 
LLRWPA by regulating its own nuclear waste and excluding out-of-
state waste. If this burdens interstate commerce, it is allowed under 
the statute. 
Further, Washington's action has only an incidental effect on inter-
state commerce. The Washington initiative bans the "importation 
and storage of nonmedical radioactive wastes generated outside 
Washington, unless permitted by interstate compact (emphasis 
added)."163 Since Governor Spellman campaigned on the basis of ne-
gotiating a regional compact,184 and since Initiative 383 authorized 
the state to enter into such compacts, subject to state and congres-
sional approval,165 it was probable that Washington would soon form 
a regional compact maintaining Richland as the first disposal site. 
This in turn would mean that Washington's ban would be lifted as to 
the other member states. Thus, the court could have found that the 
ban was more likely than not to be temporary, making the effect on 
interstate commerce only incidental. 
The Ninth Circuit's commerce clause rationale, as used to invali-
date Washington's initiative, contradicts Congress' express intention 
to delegate control of low-level waste disposal to the states because it 
applies the Pike test to a situation that Congress seems to have in-
tended to remove from that type of scrutiny. Since Spellman was the 
180 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
181 42 U.S.C. § 2021c. 
182 126 CONG. REC. 20,1366 (1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
183 See Washington Initiative No. 383, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1030 (1980). 
184 Id. 
188 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(l)(A)-(B). 
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first case construing the LLRWPA, it may have inhibited other states 
from aggressively seeking to comply with the statute by forming re-
gional compacts. In fact, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendment Act of 1985 was passed to expedite matters of compact 
formation. 
B. State or Compact Authority? 
1. Compact Option. The LLRWPA allows states to form regional 
compacts as necessary to carry out their responsibilities in disposing 
of their nuclear wastes. The Act's legislative history reveals that Con-
gress considered regional compacts to be the most efficient way to 
handle the problem.188 Congress assumed that states would form six 
or eight regional compacts167 and that states without facilities would 
join with states that had facilities with "the idea of eventually estab-
lishing an efficient, safe system of regional disposal sites."168 
2. Single State Option. While Congress envisioned regional com-
pacts as the principal way of dealing with the low-level nuclear waste 
disposal problem, no state is forced to participate in a compact. The 
main incentive for states to form compacts is that the compact group 
is expected to accept waste only from within its region.169 What hap-
pens to a state that does not join a compact? A single state may build 
a facility or may license a commercial facility to dispose of the state's 
own low-level nuclear waste, but the LLRWPA does not grant the 
state permission to refuse to accept such wastes generated in other 
states. Only groups of states that have formed compacts have that 
option. In fact, the Spellman court stressed that only "states signa-
tory to a compact could exclude waste from nonsignatory states with-
out violating the Supremacy or Commerce Clause."170 If a state can-
not restrict access to its dump to only those wastes generated within 
its borders, no incentive exists to develop a disposal facility. Yet not 
all states can or should join in a regional compact,171 and no state is 
required to do so. 
188 126 CONG. REC. 20,136 (1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
188 42 U.S.C. 2021e(a)(3)(B). 
170 684 F.2d at 630. 
171 Alaska and Hawaii would join with other states only at a significant risk to safety, since 
their wastes would be transported thousands of miles. New York, which generates approxi-
mately 11% of the nation's low-level waste (see Boston Globe, Dec. 29, 1983, at 2, table at cols. 
4-6), might not be welcomed into a compact if another state had to play host to New York's 
waste, while New York might not care to be host and accept even more waste than the substan-
tial amount it generates. 
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The sensible resolution is to allow a single state option in which a 
particular state could receive congressional approval to be considered 
a region. It would then be able to dispose of its own waste without 
being required to accept wastes from other states. Senators Thur-
mond and Hollings said that states should either dispose of their own 
waste or arrange with other states willing to accept the waste.172 The 
incentive needed for a state to proceed with its own disposal is the 
exclusionary protection granted to regional compacts. Allowing a sin-
gle state to be considered a region similar to a compact region pro-
vides that incentive. The majority of states will probably still form 
into regional compacts, but states with special circumstances, con-
cerning, for example, quantities of waste produced or geographical 
isolation, need the flexibility that the single state option allows. De-
spite the Spellman holding, the single state option comports with the 
LLRWPA's intent and with its language. 
Granting compact status to single states is also consistent with the 
market participant exception to the commerce clause. A state that 
enters the market not as a regulator, but as a participant or proprie-
tor, escapes commerce clause regulation.173 In the context of low-level 
nuclear waste disposal, this means that the state would have to con-
struct and run its own waste disposal facility and block the establish-
ment of private commercial facilities, since these sites could accept 
out-of-state wastes.174 Therefore, if a state becomes a participant in 
the market, it may choose with whom it will do business. The Su-
preme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, Inc.176 sustained this 
concept. In a plan to rid the state of abandoned automobiles, Mary-
land passed a statute providing that anyone who owned a "hulk" (de-
fined as an inoperable automobile more than eight years old) could 
turn it over to a scrap processor, who would receive a bounty from 
the state for each hulk it destroyed.176 Requirements for out-of-state 
processors to obtain a bounty from the state of Maryland were more 
complex than those for in-state processors. When a Virginia proces-
sor challenged the law because it discouraged suppliers from taking 
hulks out of state for processing, the Court upheld it. Justice Powell, 
172 126 CONG. REC. 20,136 (1980) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
173 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-1, at 298 (1985). A state is a market participant 
when it spends money to run a proprietary enterprise or provides subsidies or other economic 
incentives that help in-state business. 
174 See Prochaska, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, 5 VA. J. OF NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 383, 397 (1986). 
178 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
178 Id. 
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writing for the majority, stated that Maryland did not seek to pro-
hibit the flow of interstate commerce; it merely entered the market as 
a participant. He declared, "Nothing in the purposes animating the 
Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional 
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to 
favor its own citizens over others."177 In Spellman, Washington 
claimed that it was acting as a market participant in refusing to ac-
cept out-of-state waste. The court rejected this argument, concluding 
that Washington, in refusing entry at its borders to out-of-state 
waste, was acting as a market regulator and not as a proprietor.178 To 
have been considered a proprietor, Washington should have owned 
and operated the Richland site itself and refused entry to out-of-
state waste at the site. 
A single state that wants to be eligible for regional compact status, 
therefore, must exhibit certain characteristics in its waste disposal 
operations. It must own and operate its disposal site, be able to keep 
commercial sites from operating within the state unless the operators 
agree to restrictive terms mirroring the state facility's terms, and re-
strict access to the sites to waste generated within the state rather 
than ban importation of all out-of-state wastes. These, according to 
the Ninth Circuit, are the criteria necessary to satisfy the market 
participant exception of the commerce clause.179 
3. Potential Problems With Compacts. 
a. The Compact Approach. Potential problems with compacts in-
clude the number of compacts formed, the way they are formed, the 
status they will have after congressional approval, and whether states 
can withdraw from them. Although Congress originally considered six 
to eight compacts sufficient and did not want fifty sites in fifty 
states,180 there are currently eight compacts,181 with more planned.182 
177 Id. at 810. 
178 Spellman, 684 F.2d at 631. 
179 Id. Currently Texas is the only state committed to the single state option, although New 
York and Massachusetts are considering it. See Nichols, States Inch Toward 1986, NUCLEAR 
INDUSTRY, June 1985, at 8. 
180 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
181 The compacts approved by Congress to date are: 
Northwest: Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming 
(42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 221). 
Central: Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 222). 
Southeast: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Virginia (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 223). 
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As more compacts are formed, more sites must be found, approved 
and built. The LLRWPA's intent is to dispose of wastes as safely and 
economically as possible. A proliferation of sites works against this 
goal. 
Another potential problem with compacts is that it is possible for a 
state to enter a compact without submitting the decision to the elec-
torate.183 On such a highly emotional issue as nuclear waste disposal, 
a state might be tempted to enter a compact through the back door, 
avoiding a confrontation with voters. Voter initiatives and state laws 
have shown that many people are reluctant to allow nuclear waste 
storage in their states.184 However, at least one court has held that 
agreements to form compacts are valid if approved by "a board, com-
mission, or party duly authorized to do so by the legislature."185 Even 
informal agreements made by public service commissions have been 
found to be binding as interstate compacts.188 If a state need not seek 
the consent of the full legislature, it could commit itself to a compact 
without letting voters express their views. 
Apart from the way they are formed, compacts create the problem 
of a third layer of authority in addition to that of the federal govern-
ment and the states. For example, independent states may form a 
compact. Once the compact is ratified by Congress, however, it be-
comes an independent entity "of binding force . . . operating with 
the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers."187 Some courts 
have held that only the party states may contest the formation of the 
Central Midwest: Illinois, Kentucky. (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 224). 
Midwest: Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin. (42 U.S.C. § 
2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 225.) 
Rocky Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming (42 U.S.C. § 
2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 226). 
Northeast: New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland. (42 U.S.C. § 2021d(d) Subtitle B, SEC. 227.) 
A ninth, yet unapproved compact is Appalachian: Pennsylvania and West Virginia. See 
Prochaska, supra note 174, at 387. 
182 The California legislature recently approved California's membership in a four state com-
pact to include Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Congress has not approved this 
compact yet. Carlson, Quick Name a State Willing to Accept Radioactive Waste, Wall St. J., 
June 30, 1987, at 35, col. 1. 
183 See infra text accompanying note 185. 
184 See Spellman, 684 F.2d 627. See supra note 3. 
188 General Expressways v. Iowa Reciprocity Bd., 163 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 1968). 
188 Id. See also Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 124 F.2d 800 (3d 
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 313 U.S. 546 (1941). (The Third Circuit held valid as an interstate 
agreement an informal agreement made by the public service commissions of Pennsylvania and 
Maryland to regulate electricity.). 
187 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 657, 724 (1838). 
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compact.188 This essentially denies standing to any of the compact 
opponents. As an independent entity, the compact may control its 
member states' actions. Once approved by Congress, a compact is a 
contract that "may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered 
without the consent of all parties."189 For example, in a dispute over 
a New York-New Jersey compact regarding shipping regulations be-
tween the two states, a court held that legislation passed by New 
York to increase the compact agency's liability would not be effective 
unless New Jersey consented.190 Various similar holdings suggest that 
state law can be subordinated to compact provisions.191 
Another possible major problem involves state withdrawal from 
compacts. Traditionally, just as a state could not unilaterally pass 
legislation affecting the compact of which it was a member,192 neither 
could it unilaterally withdraw from a compact.193 Yet the LLRWPA 
permits a state to withdraw upon two to five years advance notifica-
tion to the compact if it finds the burden of membership too great.194 
A state might easily perceive its membership burden to be too great 
if it is chosen as the repository host site. A certain flexibility in mem-
bership requirements is necessary to induce a state to join, but if 
there is no real certainty that the burdens of disposal will be shared, 
the system may not operate optimally. 
Three of the approved compacts were formed around existing sites. 
These are: The Northwest Compact, with the disposal site at Rich-
land, Washington; the Rocky Mountain Compact, with facilities at 
Beatty, Nevada; and the Southeast Compact, with access to the site 
at Barnwell, South Carolina.195 To date no state has tried to with-
draw from one of these compacts, so the withdrawal provisions re-
main untested. However, Utah and Wyoming belong to both the 
Rocky Mountain and the Northwest compacts.196 Whether they will 
send waste to one or both or will have to withdraw from one is un-
188 State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 244, 59 So. 76, 79 (1912). 
188 CT. Hellmuth & Assoc, v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D. 
Md. 1976). (Hellmuth, an unsuccessful bidder for an insurance contract, sought defendant's 
records under Maryland's Public Information Act. Defendant, an interstate compact, was held 
exempt from the Act because of its compact status.) 
190 Balzano v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 232 N.Y.S. 2d 776, 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 23 A.D. 
2d 573, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 495 (2d Dept. 1965). 
181 See also Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Rao v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 122 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1955). 
192 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
193 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 92-93 (1823). 
194 Prochaska, supra note 174, at 394. 
198 See supra note 181. 
198 Id. 
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known. Kansas and North Dakota, both currently in the Central 
Compact, and Arizona in the Rocky Mountain Compact, want to 
realign with California in a new compact.197 The notification, with-
drawal, and realignment of these states may set the standard for 
others seeking to shift membership. 
b. The Single State Approach. Possible problems with the single 
state option include meeting the requirements of the market partici-
pant exception, possible preemption of state radioactive waste regu-
lation, and the expense of maintaining a facility. The market partici-
pant exception requires that the state be a proprietor.198 If a state 
were not able to prohibit the operation of a commercial site within its 
borders,199 it could not cut off the flow of out-of-state waste even if it 
were the proprietor of a site. Unless state prohibitory laws are 
drafted very carefully, they could be preempted by federal laws in 
the areas of health and safety. Finally, unless a state is a large gener-
ator of low-level nuclear waste, it may find it is too expensive to de-
velop and operate a disposal site. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Both Congress and the states realize that low-level nuclear waste 
disposal presents crucial problems that must soon be solved. Al-
though maintaining that nuclear waste safety is traditionally an area 
of federal regulation, Congress has recognized that the states should 
participate in waste disposal policy determinations. To this end, Con-
gress has delegated regulatory authority to the states to dispose of 
their own waste, preferably by forming regional compacts. The dele-
gation of authority to states is an effective way to handle the prob-
lem. The compact concept may be less effective. The compact sys-
tem, in creating an added layer of government, may allow states too 
much leeway in deciding whether, when, and with whom to form 
compacts. The biggest obstacle to the success of the compact concept 
might be the LLRWPA provision that allows states to withdraw from 
compacts with relative ease. The single state option, arguably legal 
under the statute, is a valid alternative for only a few states. 
Congress could adopt various means to ensure that the statute's 
goals are achieved. One way is to establish an upper limit on the 
number of compacts. Another way is to set a minimum number of 
"" Id. 
198 See supra note 173. 
199 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. The state prohibition against commercial 
facilities might be considered a restraint against trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). 
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states that a compact must contain. The Central Midwest Compact 
was approved with only two members, Illinois and Kentucky.200 Per-
haps such a small compact is a legislative indulgence. Another possi-
bility is to put stringent limits on the single state option to ensure 
that only states producing significant amounts of low-level waste can 
consider it. States that produce minimal amounts of low-level waste 
need not be forced to join compacts if they can arrange to buy space 
in a nearby disposal facility. Not until the percentage of waste they 
produce rises to a particular triggering point would they need to join 
a compact. 
As the 1993 deadline201 for states' low-level radioactive waste dis-
posal plans draws near, Congress may need to consider a more force-
ful approach that defers less to states' preferences and more to public 
safety. 
DEBORAH M. MOSTAGHEL 
200 See supra note 181. 
201 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2021(d)(2)(c) (West Supp. 1987). 
